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Introduction
Chinua Achebe once commented that "Any Nigerian who is old enough to remember October
1, 1960, cannot forget the high and heady feeling of hope and optimism that marked our dawn of
freedom from foreign rule." 1 In "those days," Chinua Achebe who "traveled frequently" recalled
"how good one felt to be a Nigerian abroad and carry the new and exciting green passport." 2 Today,
however, Chinua Achebe, world-renowned novelist, is in the United States, wheelchair-bound, with
an "unexciting green passport." Although not every Nigerian would make the same claim as Achebe,
considering that the birth of Nigeria was not a "planned development," 3 given its size, wealth, and
large pool of educated citizens, Nigeria was expected to play a more prominent role in Black Africa's
transformation. What is less clear, however, is why its leaders chose the path of self-destruction, even
after recognizing the profound incrimination accompanying its birth:
In January 15, 1966, a bloody coup d'etat dominated by Ibo military officers ended
the First Republic: Gen. A. Ironsi, an Ibo, became the first military head of Nigeria.
In July 1966, Ironsi was assassinated mostly by northern soldiers; Lt. Col. Y. Gowon,
a Christian from the north and former Chief ofArmy Staff, emerged as head of state.
In May 1967, the East, under Col. C. O. Ojukwu, an Ibo, declared itself "Republic of
Biafra " In July 1967, the Nigerian Civil War began, ending in January 1970. On July
29, 1975, Gowon was overthrown. Gen. Murtala Mohammed, a norther Muslim,
became head of state. Six months later, Mohammed was assassinated by Lt. Col. S.
Dimka. Gen. O. Obasanjo, a Yoruba, became head of state and the first leader to
voluntarily relinquish power to an elected president. In December 1983, President
Shagari was overthrown by Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari. On August 27, 1985,
Buhari was brought down by Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida finally
relinquished power on August 26, 1993, after annulling the presidential election
favoring Chief M.K.O. Abiola, and handpicking Chief E. Shonekan as head of an
interim government. In October 1993, Maj. Gen. Sani Abacha's circle began. 4
The annulment of the Nigerian 1993 presidential election marked the height of an increasing
pessimism among Nigerians living in the United States about the status ofNigeria as a nation-state.
Their public sentiment, widely acknowledged in the United States affirmed
:
All Nigerians abroad share the pain that most Nigerians at home are undergoing
because ofthe political impasse in Nigeria. We commend our brothers and sisters for
the patience they have exercised so far, especially for their wise conduct since the
annulment ofthe presidential results. ... It is time for a decisive change in governance
from an appointed leadership to an elected leadership. Nigerians elected a president
on June 12, 1993. It is therefore the obligation of all Nigerians and friends ofNigeria
to ensure the execution of the democratic decision of the Nigerian electorate. 5
From an American hide-out, Achebe wrote:
Today, Nigeria is in a hopeless mess. Its economy is in shambles; crime is rampant;
our judiciary [system] is a standing joke; our universities have crumbled; our hospitals
are without basic facilities and drugs. A once vibrant and proud people have been
reduced in a few years to destitution and shame. A recent visitor to Nigeria . . . could
not remember any place he left with greater relief. Our best brains are seeking a living
abroad in ever increasing numbers. . . . 6
It is not surprising, therefore, why, in responding to the Nigerian crisis, Randall Robinson,
President of TransAfrica, sadly remarked that Nigeria which "should be the bellwether state of sub-
Saharan Africa ... is [instead] verging on economic collapse."7 Backed by prominent Black
Americans, TransAfrica took the following stance:
We will oppose the Nigerian government with as much tenacity as we opposed the
[former white] South African government, with as much tenacity as we opposed the
military regime in Haiti. ... It is not easy [for Black Americans] to openly criticize
black leadership. It is uncomfortable and disquieting. But we are left with no
alternative.
8
A more expressive reaction on the part of Nigerians living in the U.S. immediately
accompanied the TransAfrica uproar. A renowned Nigerian openly pondered: "What kind of society
are we leaving behind for our children?" 9 "Nigeria," Wole Soyinka added, is a "vast prison yard;"
its military leaders, a "terrorist gang." Yet another stated: "being in the United States of America,
the most powerful nation on earth, gives you all the tools to influence what happens in Nigeria." 10
Under what settings, then, can one evaluate Nigerian indices in the United States? Are
American-based Nigerians unconsciously being prepared as the carriers of nation-state transformation
back in the homeland? If so, how are the recurring circles of Black America shaping this
development? In this paper I shall trace the development of Nigerians in the U.S. as part of an
organic process in which traditional culture, vocational certainty, individualism, religion, tribal and
ethnic allegiances, and American and the homeland crises have all converged as the measure of
potentialities and crises. I will also attempt to show how the varying circles of Black America have
impacted this development. 11
This study is divided into three parts. Part I begins with a brief historical overview of the
Nigerian background and crises, thereafter showing the patterns ofNigerian immigration to the U.S.
and their varying characteristics from 1970 to 1995. Part II analyzes the many ways in which
Nigerians have attempted to adjust into the American mosaic, resulting in the emergence of a
Nigerian community. Part III focuses on the three types of Nigerian leadership systems that have
largely shaped, and continue to influence, their organizational structures in the United States. The
study concludes with a summary ofthe major points addressed in the paper as well as suggestions for
Nigerian economic and political empowerment in this country.
Part I: Patterns and Characteristics
of Nigerian Immigration to the United States
Nigeria: A Brief Historical Overview
Nigeria came into being in 1914. In October 1960, Nigeria finally became an autonomous
nation free from British colonial rule. With an estimated population of 100 million people, Nigeria
is the most populous nation in Africa. And, of its 250 varying ethnic confluences, the Moslem Hausa-
Fulani peoples in the north constitute the largest population bloc, followed by the Yorubas in the
southwest, the Ibos in the southeast who are mostly Christians, and other smaller ethnic. Luckily,
Nigeria's differing dialectics are harnessed by the use of English as the official language of business
and political transactions. This language factor is the most evident legacy of the British imperialism.
As the richest and the most populous African country, American interests in Nigeria have
grown significantly since independence. The viability of Nigeria emerging as a pro-western
democratic leader has been the cornerstone of American policies. 12 Since becoming an independent
nation, Nigeria has had a closer economic relationship with the United States, especially in the realm
ofthe oil business than any other sub-Sahara African country. In 1973, for instance, Nigeria emerged
as a major oil supplier to the United States due to the Middle East war and the subsequent oil
embargo that accompanied that crisis. Ali Mazrui documented that, "Had Nigeria joined in the Arab
oil embargo in 1973-1974, the economic consequences for the United States would have been serious
indeed." 13 In the 1980s, Nigeria also occupied an important economic position with regard to the
United States, largely because of its oil revenue.
Politically, however, the relationship between Nigeria and the United States has been strained.
As Ali Mazrui noted, ambivalence existed between the two countries particularly during the eras of
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. As the strongest economic power in Africa, Mazrui observed,
American policies toward other parts of Africa required some consultation with the Nigerian
government. Sadly, such was not the case. During the Nixon and Reagan presidencies, the
relationship between the United States and Nigeria was often one of disagreement over issues of
concern to the majority of Africans. 14 These attitudes were largely governed by the Cold War
belligerence and stratagem.
Of course, it is also possible that the absence of a substantive diplomatic base in Nigeria may
have influenced how its relationship with the United States was coordinated. For example, during
the mid-1970s and the 1980s, the activities and official attitudes of the Nigerian diplomatic corps in
the U.S. revealed neither a clear perception nor a good understanding of the contextual and
institutional dysfunction of Nigeria; neither did their attitudes reveal any clear mastery of the social
crises ofNigerian immigrants. 15 This ineffectual representation ofNigeria and Nigerian immigrants
might have been a by-product of the crisis of the 1960s, which influenced both the decision of its
eastern region to secede from the rest of the federation, directly resulting in the Nigerian Civil War.
So, in May 1967, eastern Nigeria, under Colonel Ojukwu, declared its new sovereignty as the
"republic of Biafra." It was this act which marked the climax of the Nigerian civil unrest and
immediately triggered the so-called "War of Nigerian Unity." 16 By the time the "War of Nigerian
Unity" began, "Biafra" had neither a clear strategy for resolving the central concerns of its varying
smaller ethnic minorities, nor the precise forums to direct its interests in what would certainly have
been an Ibo-centered government. By all the available criteria, "Biafra" was an experiment which a
majority of Ibos nearly accepted while the peripheral but strategic minorities openly rejected. 17 The
euphoria of the northern Hausa-Fulani based federation to re-unite Nigeria lacked a concise vision
of national direction; their initiative toward "Nigerian Unity," through the creation of states along
ethnic lines, seemed to be a basic strategy for dismembering Biafra. Fundamentally, the Nigerian Civil
War lies in the irreconcilable backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s. 18
Thus, military intrusion in the affairs of Nigeria or their claim to save the republic from
politicians who were ruining it, 19 could not have meant that they would be more effective in directing
the delicate marriage between culturally-dissimilar groups and regions. Even if the resulting "War
of Nigerian Unity" began with the understanding that national stability and pride in the oneness of
Nigeria would be restored, evidence of such rationalization was long openly rejected. 20 From the
beginning of the civil war in 1967 to its end in 1970, neither the resolute determination of the
northern influenced federalism to re-unite the country, nor the Nigeria that emerged under their
leadership applied itself properly to policies that would resolve the crises which directly led to war.
The end of the war was rather remarkable for the emergence of a more structured ethno-centrism,
along with accompanying mismanagement and corruption at the highest places of leadership.
But, in retrospect, the manner in which the first republic was terminated may explain why
there is today a more direct Moslem Hausa-Fulani dominance of political power in Nigeria. The death
tolls accompanying the first coup d'etat dominated by Ibo military officers which affected the Moslem
Hausa-Fulani Nigerians more than the Nigerian Christians further galvanized deep-seated suspicions
and fears among the major political contenders. Worse still, the succeeding military government of
General Aguiyi Ironsi failed to demonstrate a proper contextual mastery over the delicate set-up of
the Nigerian peoples and regions. Predictably, his thrust toward a unitary government, amidst the
existing political ferment, only helped to deepen the crisis and to increase the northern fears of a
possible southern domination of the federation. 21 General Ironsi' s "unification decree" was totally
at variance with the northern interests:
Despite enormous support in the South and the army for the abolition of regionalism
and inauguration of a unitary state, the very mention of amalgamation with the south,
other than on the basis of northern control, was enough to send the North on the war
path, which was exactly what happened. 22
To surmise, however, that "the basis ofnorthern control" alone explains the alternative to the
"war path" in Nigeria is somewhat misleading. If the counter-military coup of 1967, dominated by
Hausa-Fulani officers, is seen as a direct reaction to the one dominated by Ibo military officers, the
alternative to the "war path" may ultimately be traced to a web of irreconcilable ethno-regional
differences that were simply compounded by the miscalculation accompanying the first coup d'etat. 23
Furthermore, at stake was a much larger crisis of cultural variances in regard to regional politics and
perception following the overthrow ofthefirst republic. It might not have occurred readily to some
sectors in Nigeria, particularly in the southeastern region, that a change of government which
succeeded in eliminating principal political and cultural figures of the Hausa-Fulani dominated north
was, by Islamic principles, an act of war. The strive toward a unitary government which could not
diffuse the perceived variances in regional and cultural attitudes only added further aggravations to
an historically sensitive intersection of Nigeria's philosophical direction. Between 1943 and 1948,
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) advocated "a federal system of
government for Nigeria based strictly upon tribal unit." But, according to James Coleman, "at the
NCNC convention held at Kano in September 1951, the NCNC leaders suddenly decided to abandon
federalism and switch to a unitarian position, because of their belief that the government and anti-
NCNC Nigerians were using federalism as a cloak for dismembering Nigeria."24
By overthrowing the first Federal Military Government, the northern Hausa-Fulani ushered
in leaders who have since dominated the political life of Nigeria. The northern military counter-
offensive not only had a swift advantage over the weakness ofthe Ibo-dominated coup, but it brought
along a clear and resolute will to influence the direction of the nation. Thus, it may be said that the
present day crisis in Nigeria bears strong links to the built-in incrimination of its southern and
northern peoples by the British in 1914. It is this background, perhaps more than any other, which
directly impinges collaborative efforts toward national stability in Nigeria. Since the 1960s,
Nigeria's journey as a nation-state reflects the scope of its differing contentions and disparity in terms
of regional and national preferences. 25 Consequently, nation-state culture in Nigeria is highly
dysfunctional because it has never been properly instituted and because it is deeply ingrained in
vigorous tribalism and ethnocentrism.
Yet, the extent to which the preceding background—including official corruption, bribery,
greed or excessive display of tribalism
—
justified even the overthrow of thefirst Republic26 is still
a subject of debate among Nigerians. 27 And often these debates have seemed irreconcilable. It is
unimaginable that between 1960, when Nigeria became an autonomous nation, and 1966, when the
military intervened, that its leaders could have mastered all of the complex terrains of a young nation-
state that was more internalized within the tribal and ethnic centers of its citizenry. It is significant
that, from the early to mid-1960s, what the British colonizers anticipated and strategically calculated
by way of indirect and direct rule, Nigerians themselves were to hasten the consummation. This poor
grasp ofNigeria's contextual incrimination, to a large extent, determines how Nigerians relate to their
country, to each other, and to the vital course of international affairs in an era of explosive
competition. IfNigeria's national crisis is more operative within its tribal and ethno-regional lanes,
this is precisely because its center has for too long been paralysed by political opportunism among
its hegemonic blocs.
Granted, since gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria has moved through five different
stages of government: military dictatorship (1966-1979), presidential democracy (1979-1983),
military dictatorship (1983-1993), make-shift interim civilian/military government (1993), and back
again to military dictatorship (1993). Either as a result of administrative expedience, or mere political
juxtaposition, Nigeria, which only had four regional governments at the time the military came to
power, now has thirty states governments. As Figure 1 shows, the "Multi-Statal Configuration of
Nigeria"28 is defined in accordance to ethno-regional impulses, not national ideology.
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Figure 1. Map of Nigeria with its States
Lake Chad
Source: Consulate General of Nigeria, Nigeria Information Service, 575
Lexington Avenue (New York: New York, 1994).
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Confronted with incessant political metamorphoses, the absence of a stable center in Nigeria
has meant further centrifugal crises for its diverse and differing populace. With poor management,
misrule, and decline in its oil revenue and foreign exchange reserve in the 1980s, Nigeria accumulated
a vast amount of debt, with liabilities in the millions. 29 For example, between 1985 and 1990,
"Nigeria's external debt" grew from $12.7 million to $35 billion. 30 By 1992, Nigeria's
mismanagement was much serious:
Nigeria has gone from the fertilities or riches of the 1960's and 1970's to the fallows
or failures of the 1980's. . . . The 1970's brought abundant but ill-managed oil
resources and revenue to Nigeria. The future of the 1980's include the unabated sky
rocketing public expenditures and the mismanagement of the funds thereof. Cost
efficiency and cost effectiveness were utterly ignored. 31
From the late 1970s, the deteriorating crises in Nigeria began to have a profound impact on
Nigerians studying abroad. Once among the foremost group of immigrants to return home after their
studies, they began to reverse that pattern. The devastating changes brought by military involvement
in Nigeria also led many Nigerians to migrate in greater number to the United States. By the 1 990s,
these Nigerians represent the largest concentration ofwhat Kofi Apraku correctly entitled, African
Emigres in the United States: A Missing Link in Africa 's Social and Economic Development 32
American Concentration and Immigration
As shown in Table 1, between 1960 and 1990, the general population of African immigrants in
the United States increased rather rapidly. During the three decades preceding the 1990 Census, their
population grew by 228 percent for the 1960-1969 period, 225 percent for the 1970-79, and 82
percent for the 1980-90 period.
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Table 1
Population of African Immigrants in the United States
by Decade, <1960-1990
Decade All Immigrants African
Immigrant
Percent Growth
Increase among
African Immigrants
Over Previous Decade
<1960 9,738,091 18,737
1961 - 1970 9,619,202 .61,463 228%
1971 - 1980 14,079,906 199,723 225%
1981 - 1990 19,767,316 363,819 82%
Sources: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Time Till
1970 (IT)—1980 Detailed Population Characteristics, Chapter D, U.S. Summary; "Socio-
Economic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-Born Population," detailed in Census Bureau
Tabulation, Release CB84-17, United States Department ofCommerce News (Washington, DC:
U.S. Bureau ofthe Census, October 17, 1984), Table 1, p. 5; and The Foreign Born population in
the United States: 1990, CPH-L-98, Ethnic and Hispanic Branch Population Division
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1980), Table 14, p. 85.
In 1980, Nigerians were the largest sub-Saharan African-born group (25,528), and those with
the highest ancestry group figure (47,847) in the United States. In 1990, Nigerians represented the
largest African-born group (55,350) compared, for instance, to Ethiopians (34,805), South Africans
(34,707), and Ghanaians (20,889).
34 Between 1980 and 1990, their growth level rose to 46 percent.
Table 2 indicates that in 1990, when the sub-Saharan African "Ancestry Group" figures increased
slightly by 0.1 percent, the Nigerian population (91,688) was the highest compared, for example, to
Cape Verdean (50,772), Ethiopian (30,581), and Ghanaian (20,066). Ifthe Nigerian ancestry group
figure in 1980 was compared to that of 1990, the overall growth over that particular decade would
be 3 1 percent.
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Table 2
The Sub-Saharan African Ancestry Group
in the United States, 1990
African Number of Individuals
Cape Verdean 50,722
Eritrean 4,270
Ethiopian 30,581
Ghanian 20,066
Kenyan 4,639
Liberian 8,797
Nigerian 91,688
Sierra Leonean 4,627
South African 17,992
Sudanese 3,623
Ugandan 2,681
African, others 20,607
Total 260,343
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics
Administration, 1990 Census ofPopulation: Supplementary Reports, 1990
CP-S-1.2, Detailed Ancestry Groupsfor States, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1990), Table 2, p. 4.
As Figure 2 shows, there were three clearly identifiable waves ofNigerian immigration to the
U.S. prior to the 1980s. During the first wave, Nigerians made up less than 10 percent of the total
number of African-born immigrants in the U.S. This background might imply that the Nigerian
Civil War did not really result in an immediate emigration.
12
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Figure 2. Overview of Pattern and Percentage of
Nigerian Immigration to the U.S.
<1959
I
1960-1969 1970-1974 1975-1980
; ** i Nigeria
Source: Based on "Socio-Economic Characteristics of U.S. Foreign-
Born Population" detailed in the Census Bureau Tabulation, United
States Department of Commerce News (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Bureau of the Census [CB84-179], October 17, 1984), Table 1, p. 5.
The second wave ofNigerian immigration began between 1970-1974, with a strong leap in
the numbers admitted to the U.S., ultimately raising their growth level to about 22 percent. It is
possible that this sharp increase in the growth ofNigerian immigration was a by-product of the civil
turbulence of the 1960s and the consequent oil boom economy accompanying the end of the Civil
War. The early 1970s was a period when Nigeria enjoyed enormous wealth and when a sizeable
number of its immigrants in American colleges and universities were either on federal government
scholarships or were funded directly by their regional governments. 36 Additionally, the early 1970s
pattern ofNigerian immigration was closely linked to the beginning of serious political and economic
crises in Nigeria. This was the period when the Federal Military Government of Nigeria seriously
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mismanaged the enormous oil resources of the country on policies that were inimical to Nigeria's
future as a nation. As a result, the 1970-1974 wave ofNigerian immigration reflects a mixed group:
those who were on government scholarships and those who were self-sponsored, and those who left
Nigeria because of the mounting national crises that were to result in the overthrow of General
Yakubu Gowon in 1975. The 1970-1974 configuration marked the very first clearly-identifiable
phase ofNigerian concentration in America.
The period between 1975 and 1980 marked the third wave of Nigerian immigration to the
U.S. During this phase, immigrants admitted to the U.S. from Nigeria recorded well over 68 percent
(see Figure 2), compared to Angola, for instance, with almost 70 percent. 37 Like their predecessors,
Nigerians who migrated to the U.S. during that period were mostly students. Taken as a block, the
second and third waves of Nigerian immigration constitute a major proportion of their American
build-up. The bulk of these predominantly student immigrants did not all return home after their
studies; they were to form the nucleus of the Nigerian community in the United States. The third
wave of Nigerian immigration can be explained in terms of ancestral linkages with Black America.
For example, when Black America voted approvingly for Jimmy Carter in 1976, his resultant policies
generated internal changes more favorable to African Americans and African states. In retrospect,
the African build-up in that period reflected the kind of domestic and international policies which the
Carter Administration generated. 38
The pattern of African immigration during the 1970s shows that Nigerians were the most
identifiable group witrrwide ranging national- support for further studies in the U.S. During the 1979-
1980 academic year, Nigeria alone sent more college and university students to the U.S. than any
other country in Africa; its 16,000 student body represented 37 percent of their ancestry group. 39
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Also, these Nigerians had substantially higher educational statuses, particularly among the sub-
Saharan African groups in the U.S. : 96.7 percent had their high school diplomas while 48.7 percent
were college graduates. 40
From the early 1980s, however, the official U.S. immigration policy toward the so-called
Third World began to be stricter. During this period, the allotment accorded to African immigrants
compared, for example, to the Asians and Europeans also became smaller. 41 It is not surprising that
Nigerians admitted to the U.S. between the mid-1980s and early 1990s were those in such highly-
skilled specialities as the medical and technical sciences, academia, and administrative positions 42
Only a very small number were in non-technical fields and fewer still had student visas 43
Table 3 shows the number ofNigerian physicians practicing in the United States by region of
professional certification. Based on the data in Table 3, more than 1,300 Nigerian physicians were
recorded in practice in the U.S. as of 1994. Of this number 60 percent were trained in Africa, 34
percent in America, and 5 percent in Europe.
Table 3
Nigerian Physicians in the United States
by Number and Regions of Professional Certification,
1952-1992
Region of Professional Certification Number Percentage
Africa 789 60%
America 446 34%
Europe 60 5%
Middle East 14 1%
Russia 5 .4%
Total 1,314
Source: Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa (Eds.), Directory ofNigerian Physicians in the United
States (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical Directory, 1994), pp. 1-102.
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About 24 percent ofNigerian physicians currently practicing in the U.S. were certified in the
1970s, while a majority, representing 64 percent, were certified in the 1980s (see Figure 3). Thus,
the likelihood of an American emigration, particularly for those trained in traditional African medical
schools, must have been at an all time high during the 1980s and thereafter.
70%
60%
50%
40%
Figure 3 - Overview of Nigerian Physicians In the U.S.
by Decade of Professional Certification. 1952 - 1992
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s
I
1990s
?w Percentages
Source: Graphic tabulation is based on data from the Directory of
Nigerian Physicians in the United States, The Nigerian Medical
Directory (Riverside, CA: Author, 1994) pp. 5-102.
In fact, if one were to examine the crisis in Nigeria more critically, the links between years of
professional certification of Nigerian or African-trained physicians and American emigration would
have been much clearer. For example, as shown in Figure 4, a majority of these physicians came from
the more established medical schools in Nigeria: University of Ibadan (over 35 percent), University
ofLagos (over 20 percent), and University of Nigeria, Nsukka (over 15 percent).
16
Figure 4 - Graphic Overview of Graduate
Weight Levels of Nigerian Physicians Educated at African Universities 1952-1962
40%
m
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
' Lagos ' Benin ' Jot ' Malduguri Pt. Harcourt' Sokoto ' Makerert '
Ibad Nigeria Ife liorin Zambia Cape Town Calabar A.Belo
\M Number Graduates by Percent
Source: Graphic tabulation is based on data from the Directory
of Nigerian Physicians in the United States, The Nigerian
Medical Directory, (Riverside, CA: Author, 1994) pp. 5-102.
Apart from some intermittent leads by Ethiopia during the 1981-1995 period, more Nigerians
were admitted to the U.S. than any other sub-Saharan African group (see Table 4). This pattern of
immigration can best be described as the "merging" of the first, second, and third waves that also
incorporates a succession of related waves that came much later. What this meant is that a majority
of Nigerians in the first, second and third waves (1960s-70s) who did not return home after their
studies were among the first to establish their base on American soil and that those who were still
students also settled along similar pattern upon completion of their studies.
Consequently, the fourth wave of immigration began from the early to mid-1980s as the
political and economic turbulence in Nigeria deepened. This wave of emigration consisted mostly
of American-educated Nigerians who had returned to Nigeria when the country was in a more stable
condition. With despair and increasing instability, they seized upon the slightest opportunity available
to emigrate back to the U.S.
17
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The fifth wave ofNigerian immigration included those mostly educated in Nigeria, or outside
the American system, who emigrated to the U.S. due to the same turmoil which compelled their
American-trained counterparts to flee the country. A more recent and evolving phenomenon, the
sixth wave of Nigerian immigration, is comprised of political exiles who, fearing persecution for
harboring views that are contradictory to the ruling military dictatorship, are fleeing in increasing
number. The fifth and sixth waves represent the most direct loss of educated man power drain to
Nigeria. 45
One major difference between Nigerians who emigrated to the United States prior to the fifth
migration wave and those who came afterwards is that a sizeable number ofthem—like their foreign-
born counterparts, particularly those with technical and medical training—are often required to
undergo further professional training or orientation, depending on their fields. Others who had
studied in fields not directly explicable to the American job market are primarily among those
returning to either full-time or part-time schooling to re-orient their earlier backgrounds, or even to
take up new professions altogether. Although a large number ofNigerians in the United States are
either American-educated or have come under the direct influences of American institutions, their
numerical edge does not constitute substantive power. Of the 131,487 naturalized African-born
Americans in the U.S. between 1950 and 1994, only 13,544 were Nigerians. 46
An understanding ofthe contextual distribution ofNigerian immigrants is crucial at this point.
This is necessary because Nigerian establishments are not truly united in terms of interaction among
their varying groups, nor in terms of linkages within Black or mainstream America. While their
American concentration reflects serious splits within their predominantly southern build-up, their
income status, which has improved significantly since the 1970s, 47 appears to have accelerated their
power.
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Nigerians in the Southern United States
It is in the southern United States that the fullest scope of the Nigerian dynamics can be
gauged. The make-up of this southern heartland reflects not only an understanding of favorable
geographic, economic and population settings of Black America, but a necessary leaning towards its
institutional mechanisms. To be sure, while these factors are found in other regions, they are more
directly identifiable in the south where Nigerians can be defined culturally and demographically along
African-American lines. Incidentally, immigrants from southern Nigeria constitute the largest bloc
of this Nigerian settlement in the south (or the entire United States). This might imply that the
population ofNigerians from northern Nigeria in the U.S. is not as much. If so, the emphasis is that,
given the ascendancy ofthe predominantly northern Hausa-Fulani based leadership in the homeland,
their adherents who are more likely to fare better within the system are also less likely to emigrate.
Table 5 shows that Nigerians have a much broader distribution across the major geographical
regions than their counterparts. They are concentrated more in the South (26,033), South Atlantic
(13,614), Northeast (13,501), Middle Atlantic (11,202), South Central (10,693), Midwest (8,053),
and the Pacific (6,669). Taken as a block, the entire southern geographical landscapes control more
than half ofthe population ofNigerian immigrants. This strong southward pull can be explained by
geography, economics, and cultural history. Likewise, these regions have a large concentration of
African Americans as well as Black colleges, Black political action groups, and cultural and economic
centers catering to the Black community.
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Within the southern confluence, the Nigerian-owned and pastored churches are the most
effective nerves of ancestral rejuvenation with African Americans. 48 If the total number of African
churches in the U.S. were tabulated, the Nigerian-owned churches would certainly be one the largest.
In fact, it has been observed that
the Nigerian churches have approximated the African-American base with a
certain degree of success; and may even become the nerve center for the spiritual
rejuvenation of Afrocentricism linking African Americans and Nigerians as the
larger carrier ofPan African renewal. 49
African Americans who attend these Nigerian-owned churches see some ofthem as emanating
from the not-too-altered Africanity oftheir century-lost kindred cohesion. 50 There are other reasons
for the latter development, however. First, and by far the most important, nearly all Nigerian
churches in the U.S. operate under the auspices of the Euro-American Judeo-Christian setting.
Second, these churches use English as the official language of worship, so African Americans who
attend the services have an easier time assimilating. Third, some African Americans who attend these
churches are married to Nigerians; hence, along with their American-born offspring, they represent
an effective organ of direction. This is a two-way flow of ancestral exchange because some Nigerians
are also regular supporters of the Black church.
African Americans who attend Nigerian-owned churches are harnessed into a simple but
instructive instrument of ancestral solidarity. In this development, Nigerian church owners may have
been fortunate. As confidence in traditional American-patterned churches erodes, due perhaps to
excessive displays of racism and materialism/African Americans who fully accept the message of
Afrocentricism are more spontaneous in their response to and relationship with the churches of their
ancestral kin. This type ofdevelopment is more likely to be seen among Nigerian churches which lay
22
claims to "messianic mission" from the "motherland to Black America." The Brotherhood of the
Cross and Star Church is a good example of a Nigerian church in the U.S. which has attempted to
explain its missions in terms of messianic imperatives sometimes closely linked to the southern Black
base. Unlike other Nigerian churches, the "Messianic" imperatives of the Brotherhood church appear
to be a basic reconstruction ofthe notion of Christian deification of Jesus Christ. Within its Christian
rituals, an African essence of the origin of its "Holy Father Olumba Olumba Obu," and a Nigerian
incarnation ofthe "Word" sometimes overtake the established canons of the Western-world's notion
of"Christ". But both in Nigeria and in the U.S., despite the fact that the Brotherhood attracts people
from all racial and class backgrounds, and has a world-wide representation, it is a phenomenon that
many Nigerians are likely to show some mixed feelings about. 51 Founded by Leader Olumba Olumba
Obu, and headquartered in Calabar, Nigeria, this church has been in the United States since 1971. 52
The spectrum of ancestral relationship of the Brotherhood church within the southern Black
belt provides an important basis for understanding how a particular dynamic of the Nigerian culture
has attempted to shape African Africans. Its Messianic rhetoric, as reflected in The Herald Of The
New Kingdom, has been compared to that ofDr. Martin Luther King who vigorously protested racist
and discriminatory practices in the U.S. towards minority groups. However, three decades after the
Civil Rights Movement,
... the world still looks hamstrung; and the living can bear true testimony to Luther
King that peaceful co-existence has eluded man after all.
Thus, man appears powerless when faced with oddities: life now seems useless to him.
Global economic recession, political instability and social inequality now experienced
by man, is borne out of his desire to acquire for himself all the rich bounties of nature.
The results ... are violence [and] hunger. . . , 53
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Olumba Olumba Obu declared:
Do not preach division and segregation. Do not say that some people are not
[brothers] or that some are not children of God, but rather preach that all human
beings are brothers whether they be Moslems or Christians, Buddhist, or Hinduism,
or Bahal, or Necromancer. ... Do not base your assignment on the color of your
body or on name, or place but know that we are all one through the spirit, and
brethren, who should love one another. 54
To Bishop James C. Ellerbe, the notion of"The Stone the Builders Rejected," forms the core
ofthe rejuvenation of Blacks, the fulfillment of "History", and the coming of"God to the Rescue."
This trend, Bishop Ellerbe would argue, bore more directly to the strong consciousness among
African Americans about their ancestral homeland, as evidenced, for example, by changes of their
names.
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It is, then, the historical crisis of Black America which compelled the "Messianic" mission
of leader Olumba Olumba Obu:
The Holy Spirit has now descended on this earthly plane in human form, bearing the
resemblance of one whose hairs are like wool, eyes like flames of fire and feet like
brass. Leader Olumba Olumba Obu having fulfilled that entity, is now telling the
world to embrace the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star which is the new Kingdom
of God; now on earth. The Holy Father also fulfills the text of Isaiah 63:l-2. 56
Coincidentally, the development of "Black America," which began in the church, appears
consummated by Bishop Ellerbe' s message that the Holy Spirit incarnated had now descended to
earth in person. Whether realistically, or even fanatically, some Black Americans have been led back
to Nigeria, while others have been elected as carriers of the prophetic horn. As one admirer stated:
Prior to mid-April, this year [1988], neither I nor anyone I know in Atlanta University
Center had heard of Olumba Olumba Obu, Biahapan, Nigeria, "Kingdom of God on
Earth", or Brotherhood of the Cross and Star. Then, on a rainy afternoon, many
students of my faculty heard about the Afrocentric ^Christianity that contains ideas,
aspirations, and traditions that are strange and wonderful to our ears as well as give
solace to our hearts. . . . Now, those numerous students, the department's student-
majors and faculty, student's friends . . . other teachers have heard about Olumba
Olumba Obu . . . and I know that virtually everyone wants to hear more! 57
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Surprisingly, the preceding emphasis does not quite imply that Nigerian immigrants and
African Americans have been able to evolve effective mechanisms of ancestral empowerment in the
U.S. Ifthey are culturally and demographically aligned, they are markedly dissimilar in some critical
characteristics even as two related and historically affected groups; both cultural and socio-economic
forces determine how the two kindred groups perceive each other. 58 Along with other reasons, 59
therefore, the southern concentration of Nigerians exhibits a loose communal settlement along
African-American lines. Unlike Asian, Latino, and European immigrants who often settle along their
ancestral lanes, in the south or elsewhere in the U.S., Nigerians are neither consciously organized
under a neighborhood-based structure among themselves or side by side with African Americans, nor
are they emboldened by the mainstream notion of an American amalgam. Seriously seeking to
assimilate but rejected despite their higher educational status, their hard-won success, which is part
ofthe all-time "American myth of the triumph of the common man,"60 warrants greater pathos as it
bears directly on how they have attempted to rise above the social ostracism and denigration which
confront them to participate in the free enterprise system.
Part II: Toward A Nigerian Community:
Adjusting into the American Mosaic
Similar to other sub-Saharan African immigrants, as Nigerians became entrenched as a largely
"voluntary exile" group, they began to show greater interest in settling in the United States and in
gaining citizenship. The policy of the Nigerian government which allows dual citizenship for its
citizens living abroad has made it easier for them to re-orient themselves more effectively between
the two worlds. 61 The fact that the Nigerian federal government did not recognize dual citizenship
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for its citizens until 1990 may have accounted for the low rate of Nigerians who have U.S.
citizenship.
The most expedient angle of refocusing which Nigerian immigrants have undertaken in the
U.S. has been in their occupational choices. In the 1970s when the political ferment in Nigeria was
less turbulent and the oil wealth was the plausible magnet for American courtship, most American
universities flooded the Nigerian regions with applications for students who responded
enthusiastically by coming to the "New World". 62 This was a period when the average Nigerian
immigrant sought a degree granted by an American institution due to its perceived economic and
social status back in the homeland. This was also the period when Nigerian immigrants had more
faith in university degrees.
63 As the hope for educational reward began to wane in the early to mid-
1980s, due to the political crisis in Nigeria, a small number ofNigerian students who were stranded
and who could not adjust readily became more directly susceptible to some negative American
lifestyles. The latter development might have been influenced by the social and immigration policies
proposed and implemented during the Reagan Administration.
Also, either as a consequence of limited economic viability within the American confluence,
or even racism, the social circumstances which confronted Nigerians during that period drastically
reduced their level of productivity. With neither the right job experience after their training, nor the
necessary financial base to function independently in a capitalist society, this class of educated but
largely underutilized Nigerians began a slow but painful retreat into self re-discovery. 64 In their
exploration, perhaps unconsciously, they rediscovered patterns of survival mechanisms typical of 19th
century Black America when the compulsions ofEuro-American racism implied that the Negroes had
to develop technical and industrial skills for their economic survival. 65 Pressed by the demand for
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technical skills as a survival stratagem, some Nigerians went back to school and "traded" their
bachelor's, master's and doctorate degrees for associate degrees in economically high-demand fields
such as electronics, auto mechanics, nursing and electrical engineering. 66 This sad realization led Ken
Igboanugo to lament that "[i]t is unfortunate for Nigerians to have spent four years or more getting
the college degree(s) before realizing . . . the job market requires ... a very smart move."67
Ifthe job market strategies for Nigerians implied an adjustment through community colleges
for the necessary survival skills, their relationship to universities implied more control over their
occupational independence and status:
Today in America, Nigerians who focus on technical education are the beneficiaries
ofthe opportunities of this land. . . . Those who remain in the areas of academic are
doing fairly well. However, those with technical knowledge are even more
enterprising.
The technicians like plumbers and auto mechanics are investing their skill in the
challenge of America—the land of opportunity. Realizing that there is no free lunch
in America, they have taken out time to evaluate the reality of living in America: what
Nigerians ought to be doing. 68
The particular case of a Nigerian, chef Abu Abukokha Amed, of Philadelphia, is worthy of
note here for Chef Abu' s background offers a more explicit overview of the general trend of the
refocusing ofNigerian immigrants in the 1980s. Chef Abu himself observed that:
Back in the 1980s, the first thing I noticed upon my arrival in the U.S. was the near
total lack of African restaurants, despite the fact that America had a sizeable
population of continental Africans. 69
So, after graduating with a bachelor's degree in business management, Abu, who was
immediately absorbed by the "Bloomingdale's department store" as a sales person, began to explore
"what venture was most promising in terms of financial security and satisfaction."
70 Assured that he
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could apply his background in business studies to a restaurant-based exploit, he began his
"lunch-truck business" on a "trial and error" basis. To further acquaint himself with the kind of
make-shift business dynamics he intended to pursue, Abu started selling such American fast food as
"hot dogs, cheese, hot sausages, and things like that." Then, after mastering the market and
determining his potential audience, he made a very personal but important decision: "I . . . decided
to sell what other traders did not provide—African food; this was the only chance I saw open to me
for economic survival. And so I started selling the so-called ethnic food." 71
Kwame Okoampa-Ahoafe, Jr., chronicler of"ChefAbu of Philadelphia," indicated that, when
Abu began to count his triumphs, he never forgot those who helped "to make me what I am today."
Underneath Abu's pleasant and personable ways of not forgetting the human forces that were
instrumental in his success was a most revealing aspect of the kind of social adjustment undertaken
by most Nigerians in the 1980s. As Abu stated,
You know, I never thought I was going to end up working in a food truck ... my
traditional African mentality taught me that a scholar should always work at a white-
collar job. This attitude prevented me, for a long time, from seeing myself the way
I am today. 72
Accompanying the success ofNigerians' adjustment were efforts to organize themselves into
their national settings within the American mosaic. They not only started to extrapolate the beauty
of their cultural diversity to the mosaic, but, along with their inherent entrepreneurial spirit, they
began to stamp their marks on society. Table 6 shows various types of cultural groups that cater to
the general direction ofNigerian cultures in the United States.
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Table 6
Sample Profiles of Nigerian-U.S. Based
Entertainment and Cultural Groups
African Network TV, LA
The Majestic Ekimogun Club, USA, Inc., Providence, RI
Calabar Cultural Dance Club, Washington, D.C.
The Greater Owerri Club, Houston, TX
Enugu State Women Cultural Group, Houston, TX
Oyemekun International Club, USA, Inc., Baltimore, MD
Nigerian Club International, Seattle, WA
Fredimo Cross Cultural Production, Philadelphia, PA
The Nigerian Foundation, Houston, TX
Igbo Language Service, Washington, D.C.
The Nigerian Club of Tampa, FL
Itsekiri Cultural Club, Southern California
The Ogor Okpala Women's Cultural Group, Houston
Umuahia Cultural Dance, Houston, TX
Owo Heritage Club, Dallas, TX
Nigerian Eagle Soccer Club, Inc., Washington, D.C.
Akwa Ibom State Women Association, Houston, TX
Atlantic Club of Greater Kansas City, Kansas City, KS
Nigerian Cultural Association, St. Louis, MO
People Club of Nigeria, USA Branch, Houston, TX
African Herald, Dallas, TX
African News Weekly, Charlotte, NC
African Business Source, Houston, TX
African Imagination, Houston, TX
African Fabric and Accessories, Atlanta, GA
African Profiles, New York
People's Club of Nigeria, Houston, TX
The Nigerian Family, Sicklerville, NJ
The Wazobia Club, Washington, D.C.
Nigerian Club, USA, Hackensack, NJ
Nigerian Power Club, Washington, D.C.
The Nigerian Democratic Alliance, Washington, DC
Global African Independent Cable TV Network
Readville, MA
Source: Exploratory Survey ofNigerians in Major U.S. Cities (1990-1995).
There can be no doubt then that nearly all the tools needed for the development of a Nigerian
community in the United States were fairly well in place by the early 1980s. By the mid-1980s,
Nigerians were already well ahead of the fact that the decisive questions in America's civic and
democratic future were those concerning whether it would be truly possible to incorporate ideas of
multi-cultural inclusiveness. In fact, by the late 1980s, they had already envisioned the context of
their American interaction and their efforts in the realm of entertainment, cultures and economics
were beginning to rest on the certain but complicated foothold that Julia Teresa Quiroz discussed in
her book, Together in Our Differences 13 These Nigerians understood that changing and forging a
social contract that is imaginative and inclusive within the American confluence would require much
assertiveness, due to the racial crisis of American society. To them, the varying concept of America's
multi-cultural inclusiveness, or even its exclusiveness, was not very difficult to fathom. Even those
29
of them who did not understand had other ways of responding. But, those who understood
immediately saw their proximity to Black America as an important foothold to explore opportunities.
With emerging economic implications of Afrocentric renaissance, these Nigerians were among the
first to discover that African Americans were interested in African artifacts and Afrocentric wares,
and could become important liaisons in the effort to market the African identity. By the mid-1980s,
the bulk of their cultural mechanisms was readily identifiable within the Black base, both as a natural
impulse of its ancestral relationship as well as an imperative of racial identity. 74
Thus, by the early 1990s, the grounds for optimism with regards to the success ofNigerian
adjustment into the American culture were fairly obvious in cities like Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta.
At the present time, the communal dynamics of Nigerian immigrants can be seen in how they have
harnessed the American free enterprise zone with its blend of individualism along with their inherent
aggressiveness for survival. The fact that today there are many Nigerian-owned businesses and
private property in such heavily-populated cities like Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Los Angeles, New York, Washington, D.C., and Houston is an eloquent testimony to the emergent
strength ofNigerians within the American capitalist system. For these are highly-populated industrial
centers of the U.S., where there exist unmistakable evidences of Nigerian professionals in the
computers, law, academics, automobile dealership, medicine and the real estate industry. These are
also centers where Nigerian professionals are often seen displaying their hard-won success in such
grandiose styles as the kinds of cars they drive, the neighborhoods in which they live, their style of
dressing, and even accentuation to the names ofuniversities or colleges they had attended.
Today, many Nigerians who reside in the United States have acquired the material status that
has surpassed that of many Americans. 75 Nonetheless, if the version of free enterprise and
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individualism to which Nigerian immigrants have adapted themselves is inherent in the American
cultural psyche, it is also based on that of their homeland background. That is, they have adopted
their traditional ethics to the American setting and transformed them. As Ali Mazrui writes,
capitalism among Nigerians "is relatively assured" due to their "vigorous level of individualism," and
because they have a "highly developed acquisitive culture "76 But, in Nigeria, Mazrui also notes,
there is an "underlying attachment to liberal values [which] embodies structural pluralism "in the
society, diversity of power centers ethnically, regionally, and in terms of religious differentiation." 77
Thus, the idea ofindividualism as it touches on the character ofNigerians and Americans is as similar
as it differs operationally. While a typical American individualist, for example, often isolates himself
or herself into a personal world,
78
the Nigerian isolates more into his tribe or ethno-national settings.
While an American operates more on the level of selfhood and very often recognizes the essence of
the nation as a necessary umbrella, 79 the Nigerian operates more within the tribal and ethno-regional
point of selfhood and often compromises the essence of the nation. 80 The character of hard work,
therefore, forms a much clearer picture of similarity between the two distant cultural groups. Yet,
the strong consciousness oftribalism and ethnocentrism of Nigerian immigrants does not really imply
that the idea of their national center is lost; but rather that their varying languages, tribal and ethno-
regional aspirations, which have lacked focussed leadership, are often in conflict with the direction
of the Nigerian nation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Nigerian community is still very
unstable within the scattered debris of the American mosaic.
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Part HI: Leadership in the Nigerian Community 81
By the early 1980s, three phases of leadership were visible among Nigerians in America, and
continue to exist in their organizational structures. They are: the Ethnic-Conscious Leadership, the
Elected-Type Leadership, and the Attorney- or Representative-Type Leadership.
• Ethnic-Conscious Leadership
The ethnic-conscious leadership ofNigerian immigrants, which reflects a strong consciousness
ethnic affiliations, is made of community brethren who are senior members of the community.
Usually charismatic, knowledgeable, and wise about the traditional values of their people, ethnic-
conscious leaders are not always democratically-elected in the manner in which the Western world
defines the concept. Yet, the process for nominating them implies nomination with the full consent
of the clansmen, and the consent of the clansmen becomes a vehicle for using traditional modalism
to harness democratic mannerisms. As pivotal traditional links to the needs of their ethnic
community, these leaders serve as immediate rallying centers and support transfers in times of crisis.
Among Nigerians in this class are those who are highly educated and those who are in good standing
within their clansmen communities, some ofwhom are addressed by the official title of "chief '.
Depending on the traditional set-up of a given community, ethnic-conscious leadership often
reflects the brunt of a carry-over of tradition from the homeland; that is, there are Nigerians in this
class who would still have been leaders even if they were not in the U.S. The fact that they left their
native communities for further studies in the U.S. does not abrogate being recalled home to assume
traditional responsibilities. Ifthey are in the U.S., this becomes an asset to those who recognize and
rely on them. Some Nigerians in this class have had to step down from academia to take up their
rightful titles as traditional rulers back home. 82
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Luckily, some ofthe specificities governing how ethnic-conscious leaders are nominated or
elected have the merit of defeating the wider conflict of the "tyranny of the majority" inherent in
traditional Western models of democratic leadership. 83 But, leadership within this ethnic enclave is
where Nigerians, perhaps more unconsciously, are more likely to be drawn away from their national
center as well.
In the event there is no rightful figure to rally his clansmen, the role of an ethnic-conscious
leader can be assumed through consultations with clansmen. It is wrong for any Nigerian to assume
the role of an ethnic-conscious leader without the consent of the people. This is because group
solidarity among Nigerians is much stronger within their ethnic bases than within larger national
relationships. Whether democratically elected or chosen in accordance with existing traditional
norms, ethnic-conscious leaders are very much effective within their specific ethnic group as well as
the larger ethno-regional sector.
At this point, an explanation may suffice as to why the ethnic-conscious leadership is seen as
a powerful mechanism among Nigerian immigrants. First, Nigerians are strongly aligned along ethnic
lanes. Their approximation to one another, as to language, cultures and traditional customs,
compounds a much-needed sense of trust not readily evident in their spurious center. Second, the
essence of ethnic-conscious leadership, by itself, reflects the real brunt of the historical crisis of sub-
nationalism back in Nigeria and among American-based Nigerians. Seen in this context, it is the
consciousness of the ethnic kinfolks, as well as the hegemonization of regional power at the center,
that is the major carrier of the ethnic-conscious leadership. 84 One sees also in this web of complex
setting that without any concise line of national community, the soul of the country is bound to
become exhausted through the gruesome journey from specific ethnic enclaves to the larger ethnic
regions and to the national center. __
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Overall, on matters ofnational interests, both the peripheral and hegemonic blocs of an ethnic
leadership have to converge through a democratic process to examine relevant issues. Thus, efforts
to direct ethnic clansmen on larger issues oftraditional values, regional well-being, and the nation are
the very imperatives which make ethnic-based leaders circumspect to a composite democratic
assemblage, markedly dissimilar from the much limited community-clansmen type. It is not,
therefore, unusual for ethnic-based leaders to embody the real crux of democratic leadership at the
larger apex of sub-regional and national movements ofNigerian immigrants.
It seems to be this strong ethnical cleavage ofNigerians along petty "Multi-Statal" lines, as
Kwame Ahoofa, Jr, would argue, 85 which justifies their balkanization back in the homeland as well
as compels the elective contest of an ethnic-based leadership in the U.S. Against the imperatives of
regional variations, these leaders often attempt to fashion their roles in such a democratic manner as
will include all the inter-related interest groups within the region(s). Through elective representation,
often governed by a written constitution, their leadership has proven effective in directing ethnic
affiliates within the specific clansmen's enclaves and within wider geographical lanes.
• Elected-Type Leadership
In contrast to the ethnic-conscious leadership, the elected-type leadership is more
operationally an elected body ofNigerian immigrants with the Nigerian national outlook at the core.
Unlike the elective rampart of ethnic-conscious leadership, elected-type leadership is more likely to
rely on a working constitution to frame memberships' aspirations. Like the ethnic-conscious
leadership, however, the very fact of cultural and regional diversity ofNigerians creates a composite
climate for inter-group conflict and coalition for the alternately aspiring democratic tenet of
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leadership. While not claiming to be ethno-centric, elected-type leadership attempts to espouse its
mission in terms of linkages that cut across regional lanes to the national center. But since ethnic
consciousness is very strong among Nigerians, it also exudes with a vivid sense of ethnic and regional
pandering. 86
At the very least, the elected-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is more definitive in
terms of duration oftime required for service. Governing officers who are not trustworthy in the eyes
of their electorates either voluntarily resign at the end of their tenure or are expected to face rigorous
re-election contests by presumably more trustworthy class of freshmen brethren. As often is the case
during these changes where the leadership machineries of the national chapters are not well
structured, the peripheral or affected units break apart to form independent associations. This might
very well explain why there are various ramifications of national chapters claiming to serve Nigerians.
This is the central dilemma confronting many Nigerian organizations with elected-type leadership in
the U.S.
The elected-type leadership ofNigerian immigrants may be said to operate under two central
contexts. That is, while each American state may have a body of elected officials, sometimes their
functionaries are accountable to the national chapters. Depending on how the center is structured,
the national chapters oversee the other regional bodies and keep records of events. Aside from the
complex coordination of activities under the elected-type leadership, both the local and, indeed, all
its regional affiliates and auxiliaries are to actively support the national chapters. Within the U.S.,
elected-type leaders constitute a more likely class 1o be seen attempting to examine the Nigerian
crisis. This is the class of leadership charged with the responsibility of catering to the varied interests
ofNigerian immigrants locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally. As well, it is the class of
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leadership most likely to be seen re-directing the concerns ofNigerians to the Nigerian Consulates
and reporting back to the mass, either with the directives ofthe Nigerian government or the American
government. In this way, elected-type leaders embody the diverse interests of the electorates whom
they represent. 87
Qualification for both the state and national levels of elected-type leadership often requires
an ability to connect with the wider spectrum of ethnic structures, especially those of the minorities
who may not always be fairly represented. Thus, the elected-type leadership blends with a deep
consciousness of ethnic class; sometimes this consciousness is a source of conflict for those who are
not well-connected. 88 This does not mean, however, that an elected-type leader cannot evolve from
among the ordinary branches ofNigerian immigrants. The emphasis is that the likelihood of success
in such an occurrence will require a substantial degree of organizational activism and grassroots
mobilization of community brethren during elections. 89 It must be noted, nonetheless, that the
apparent signs of stronger solidarity among Nigerians at the ethnic level are important locales for
understanding the make-up of the Nigerian leadership crisis even in America.
• Attorney- or Representative-Type Leadership90
Of the two structures of Nigerian leadership discussed thus far, the attorney- or
representative-type leadership is markedly different, and certainly more independent. While it is based
on legal modalities of the American world, the related legal services directly pivotal to Nigerian
communities compel its representative nature. The attorney wing of the Nigerian leadership might
even be the real parameter for understanding the class of Nigerian professionals with substantive
influence over the rest of their homefolks. Although this class of leadership is not always
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democratically elected, as attorneys and representatives of their brethren, their roles are inevitable.
Yet, since most ofthem are heads ofNigerian organizations, they have to be democratically elected.
What really determines the direction within the attorney-based leadership is the kind of credibility they
have in their respective communities.
Of course, there are more fundamental reasons for the pre-eminence of attorney-type
leadership of Nigerian immigrants in the American context than one might say of their" other
leadership branches. First, the characteristics of American institutional mechanisms make it possible
to say that Nigerians are more likely to be influenced by the attorney wing of their native leadership
structure. The racism that confronts Nigerian immigrants living in the U.S., along with their ensuing
image crisis, provides testing battle lines for Nigerian attorneys to develop their professional clientele
even before qualifying for practice through the rigorous bar exam. These attorneys are the true
patrons and spokesmen ofNigerian communities and, in fact, may be said to rely on their community
brethren for professional stability. By actively supporting their brethren's communities and
representing their kinfolks in varied court cases, they are better able to compete on a professional
level.
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Second, ifNigerian immigrants are to be effective participants in the American mosaic and
are to develop the kind of institutional mechanisms that other ethnic groups have developed, it would
most likely be done through the legal wing of their native professionals. Indeed, in some American
cities, they have attempted to lay the foundation for developing investment outlets to enhance
economic growth and inter-cultural networking through such notable organizations as the Nigerian
and African Chambers of Commerce. 92
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Although the economic status of Nigerian attorneys is not very easy to gauge, the evidence
suggests that they have done quite well. Nonetheless, such evidence is not clearly indicative of an
overall economic stability. There are, indeed, reasons why one should expect a much limited financial
security among a majority of the attorney-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants than might be the
case, say, for Whites, Asians, and African Americans. Certainly the color-line crisis of the American
world is one factor. Moreover, the duration of professional stability in a stratified society accounts
for their disadvantage as a foreign-born group. Though some Nigerian attorneys have clients who
are Americans, such a market is already saturated by stiff competition from American-born attorneys.
In the end, this background explains the extent to which they are closer to their brethren and their
influence over them. Whether and in what manner they are financially stable is not as important as
the fact that they understand the American judiciary system and, therefore, are often those consulted
by community clansmen for assistance. 93
Unlike their American counterparts, some Nigerian attorneys are addressed as "Doctor",
. according to the official insignia of "Doctor of Jurisprudence" degree awarded them. Between the
Nigerian "Juris doctors" and academic doctorates (including Ph.D.), there is a tilt of professional class
consciousness. 94 Reportedly, Nigerian attorneys who subscribe to the more prestigious but less title-
conscious name of"attorney" are more able to woo their brethren as clients; that is, they connect at
a level more acceptable to the professionally less-established community brethren. 95 However, some
Nigerian attorneys who prefer to be called "Doctor" had had doctorate degrees before taking up legal
study.
96 On the other hand, they come from backgrounds where achieved and social statuses go hand
in hand with the notion of success.
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Obviously, class consciousness among Nigerian immigrants is not only one of perception and
status but one reflecting the texture of their crises along ethnic and national lines. In fact, class
consciousness among Nigerians—like African Americans—reflects a continuing crisis of the black
identity. Perhaps moreso for Nigerians than African Americans, success among the professionally-
secure class is sometimes seen as a by-product of proper orientation and acceptance by mainstream
America. This is particularly the case for those who attended prestigious, ivy tower institutions.
Sometimes such ivy tower-based claims encourage misunderstanding between them and the ordinary
community brethren, leading directly to crises. In this manner, unbeknownst to most Nigerians, they
have reconvened almost along similar lanes of continuing crises in their homeland.
The humble manners of the democratic citizenry, which are a remarkable characteristic of
Americans and which are still evident in the attitude of their professionals, cannot be said to have
permeated the leadership structure ofNigerian immigrants in any substantial way. If, however, there
are Nigerian leaders with less consciousness for prestigious titles who are fully cognizant of the
humble responsibilities of community leadership, they are an isolated minority. 97 More established
professionals such as physicians, academicians, and engineers are in the minority. The extent to which
they have influence over the vast majority of Nigerians is not readily determined, nor are their
influences readily visible within a capitalist structure that has absorbed them.
It would be presumptuous, however, to expect so much so soon from Nigerian skilled-class
establishments within the capitalist system. Not only are they bound to have minimal influences as
one of the most recently-arrived groups, their professional stability requires some time for the
necessary development of institutional powers. Nevertheless, the emphasis is that their numerical
power is already at a level where they can fare better much earlier if they choose to adjust into their
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communities as a first step. To some extent, the notion of the Nigerian or even African "skilled
class,"
98
is vague due to the "instability" in their American and African worlds. Particularly within
their African sector, this "instability," which is not truly economic, means that the upward
professional mobility ofthe more established Nigerians over the less-fortunate brethren often creates
a magnet for social and cultural stress. Where linkages between the more-established skilled class
and their less-established mass within the capitalist system are largely dysfunctional, converting their
numerical power into a collaborative channel of nation-state development back in Nigeria is bound
to be imprecise.
Conclusions
Since the 1970s, Nigerian-born populations in the United States have increased rather steadily.
Whereas in 1980, there were 25,528 Nigerians in the U.S., by 1990, that number rose to 55,350,
representing a 46 percent growth within one decade. The survival stratagem of most Nigerians in the
.
United States is a basic replay of the 19th century scheme of Black America. Their American
gravitation, which is mostly southward, is also linked to Black America. While Nigerians and African
Americans can be defined along similar lines, their residential or neighborhood settlement patterns
are loosely linked. Thus, efforts toward constructive development in Nigeria on the part of African
Americans require more substantive framework, partly because it is in the interest of Black America
to faithfully labor for Nigeria's [Black Africa] economic and political regeneration.
This bond between Nigerians and African Americans are strongest at the intergeneration level.
The general thrust of this development points toward a possibility of sustainable network between
Nigerian offspring and African Americans in the spheres of cultural, economic, political linkage.
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Furthermore, American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants represent a conciliatory generation
to Black America." This means that the earlier crisis of historical dislocation has finally caught up
with a more definitive nerve of an ancestral regeneration. Although this trend is not specific to the
experience(s) ofBlack America and Black Africa, nonetheless, it can be seen as an imperative of their
more profound historical crises, which, although slightly dissimilar to those of Jewish America, 100
appears geared toward similar rejuvenation and continuity. Therefore, what is needed at this juncture
is an orderly interface of the machinery of ancestral relationships between African immigrants and
African Americans.
Ofthe three phases ofNigerian leadership, the attorney- or representative-type leadership is
the most viable for economic and political transformation of the Nigerian immigrant community.
Nigerian attorneys are more directly linked in professional training and services to American
institutions and Nigerian communities.
The human resource-power of Nigerian immigrants is immeasurable for nation-state
transformation back in Nigeria. But only a careful coordination can enhance their chances of
development. Any concerted vision of development linking Nigerians in the U.S. to the homeland
will require, as a first step, a serious re-ordering oftheir national attitudes. There are still no readily
acceptable lanes among them to channel issues of national development and fellowship. Efforts
toward constructive changes in Nigeria can have adverse consequences if the American interplay of
Nigerians is misunderstood. This study suggests that it may be unrealistic to underestimate the crisis
of Nigeria's equilibrium, which provides a road map for understanding its immigrants. Among
American-based Nigerians, tribal and ethno-regional reliance shrouds over the generic assumption
of national fellowship. If, while on American shores, Nigerians are unable to reconcile their national
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differences, chances are they will be unable to do the same back in the homeland. What the American
confluence represents to Nigerian immigrants will be a subject of considerable inquiry by students of
Nigerian affairs in the twenty-first century.
To begin, Nigerians in America may be well off if they re-examine the extent to which alien
rationales about development affect the context of their national crises. There is nothing wrong in
outsiders' ideas that are meaningful to advancement. The "Western Barbarians," as Michael Wood
would argue, did so successfully. 101 What is wrong is when such criteria violate the pathway to the
real imperatives of national sovereignty. Without proper caution, Nigerian immigrants (Africans),
seeking to influence the course of their homeland development, may very well succeed in furthering
their contextual and national dysfunctions.
What is needed at this juncture is the ability to recognize those aspects of the outsiders'
civilization crucial to the Nigerian component—and rejecting those that are not. More serious efforts
must be made by American-based Nigerians to understand the context in which western principles
,
can be successfully extracted. Similar efforts are required from Nigerian immigrants interested in the
far eastern world concept. This approach is all the more necessary if the idea of Nigeria ever
remaining one country is to be taken seriously. In turn, this implies explaining linkages with the
maturity ofthe emergent global alignment. What Nigeria will be like after the military era is an issue
that Nigerian immigrants have to tackle honestly, and in its proper context. If the crises in Nigeria
are necessary to trigger more concise lines of rational regeneration, they are pivotal.
For historically, Nigeria's retardation is a reflex of the failures of its peoples to reorder
themselves from the manner in which they were drawn into alien camps. American activism by
Nigerians to effect changes in Nigeria can only lead to a lasting peace if they align themselves
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properly in the emergent global set-up. If they do, wisdom will be sought through a re-evaluation
of the generational experience of Black America. Is this the proper intersection in which to
understand The Bell Curve argument? 102 What, then, does The Bell Curve and Paul Kennedy's thesis
on Preparing for the Twenty-First Century really imply? 103 So there is a certain weakness in
comparing Nigeria's (Africa's) pace of development to that of Asia without addressing its profound
polarization and contextual entrapment within the European and the Asian global network. 104 " Such
a weakness must be corrected immediately and made an integral part of a new rethinking toward
economic and political empowerment in the United States.
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